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A Computational Analysis of Cognitive Eﬀort
Luca Longo and Stephen Barrett
Department of Computer Science and Statistics - Trinity College Dublin
{llongo,stephen.barrett}@cs.tcd.ie

Abstract. Cognitive eﬀort is a concept of unquestionable utility in understanding human behaviour. However, cognitive eﬀort has been deﬁned
in several ways in literature and in everyday life, suﬀering from a partial
understanding. It is common to say “Pay more attention in studying that
subject” or “How much eﬀort did you spend in resolving that task?”, but
what does it really mean? This contribution tries to clarify the concept
of cognitive eﬀort, by introducing its main inﬂuencing factors and by
presenting a formalism which provides us with a tool for precise discussion. The formalism is implementable as a computational concept and
can therefore be embedded in an artiﬁcial agent and tested experimentally. Its applicability in the domain of AI is raised and the formalism
provides a step towards a proper understanding and deﬁnition of human
cognitive eﬀort.
Keywords: Cognitive Eﬀort, Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Virtual Agents.

1

Introduction

Attention plays a central role in the behaviour of human beings. The concept of
attention has been inconclusively studied in the history of psychology since the
early years of the nineteen century. A plethora of deﬁnitions has been proposed
and a large number of studies have been carried out in diﬀerent directions. In
1908 Titchener [1] asserted that: “the doctrine of attention is the nerve of the
whole psychological system, and that as men judge of it, so shall they be judged
before the general tribunal of psychology”. Behaviourists and Gestalt theories
shared the conviction that the operations which relate output, such as response
or percept, to input, such as stimulus or ﬁeld, conform to a simple set of rules,
such as isomorphism or conditioning [6]. By the end of the 1950s, the situation
radically changed and the new concept of attention was a central topic in an
emergent cognitive psychology that ascribed more spontaneity and autonomy to
the organism implying some degree of local unpredictability than the previous
classical doctrines. Post-behaviouristic psychology used the label of attention to
denote some of the internal mechanisms that determine the signiﬁcance of stimuli
and therefore make it impossible to predict behaviour by stimulus consideration
alone. In everyday language, attention is the act or faculty of attending, by
directing the mind to an object or thought. Psychologists refer to attention as a
state of consciousness characterised by such concentration.
N.T. Nguyen, M.T. Le, and J. Światek
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Let’s now consider the example of Luca, a young schoolboy. Luca does not
like school that much, as most of his coetaneous, and for this reason he enjoys a
pleasant state of drowsiness most of the time. When the teacher calls attention
to him, Luca does not merely fail to pay attention but he has less attention to
pay. This facts suggests that the drowsy schoolboy merely suﬀers from, or perhaps enjoys, a general low level of attention paying a small amount of cognitive
eﬀort. This example illustrates the dynamic construct of the concept of eﬀort
that changes within individuals in response to individual and environmental factors. This thesis is sustained by motivation theories [2] [3] and contrasts with
recent empirical studies that have tended to treat eﬀort as a static concept [4].
Berlyne suggested, in 1960, that the intensity of attention is related to the level
of arousal that can be measured with electrophysiological techniques, and that
is largely controlled by the properties of the stimuli to which the organism is
exposed [5]. He was mainly concerned with involuntary attention. In voluntary
attention, the subject attends to stimuli because they are relevant to a task that
he has chosen to perform and not because of their arousing quality. This suggests that the intensive aspect of attention corresponds to eﬀort rather than to
mere wakefulness. Theories of information processing consider cognitive eﬀort as
a hypothetical construct, regarded as a limited capacity resources that aﬀects
the speed of information processing [6]. In the work of Norman and Bobrow [7],
if a task is resource-limited, then the performance will improve if more cognitive
eﬀort is allocated to the task. Although cognitive eﬀort may be a hypothetical
construct, it is a subjective state that people have introspective access to [8].
In the literature there are several attempts towards the measurement of cognitive eﬀorts. It is a multi-faceted phenomenon: it can be related to physiological
states of stress and eﬀort, to subjective experiences of stress, mental eﬀort, time
pressure, and to objective measures of performance levels. These various aspects
of cognitive eﬀort have led to distinct means for assessing workload including
physiological criteria such as heart rate, skin temperature, pupils dilation, blood
pressure, respiration, performance criteria such as quantity and quality of performance by using primary task and secondary task measures, and subjective
criteria such as rating of level of eﬀort, self-report measures [9]. Despite an extensive literature, there appears to be no attempt to formalise the concept of
cognitive eﬀort as a computational concept therefore our goal is to begin the
development of a formalism suitable for computations. Our research question
here is:
How can we formalise cognitive eﬀort as a computational concept?
We propose to develop a formalism, suitable for ongoing reﬁnement, that captures the core aspects of a more complete theory. The subjective nature of the
concept is noted in section 2 where a literature review underlines the main factors
that inﬂuence cognitive eﬀort. The methodology adopted towards the formalisation of cognitive eﬀort is presented in section 3. In section 4 we present our
heuristic formalism built on these factors. We consider possible ﬁelds of applications in 5 and a synthesis of open issues and future works in section 6.
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Related Work and Review of Cognitive Eﬀort

Cognitive eﬀort is a subjective phenomenon. One of the classic dilemmas of psychology concerns the division of attention among concurrent streams of mental
activity. Humans often perform several activities in parallel. They suppress or
queue stimuli on their behaviour organisation, underling an internal bottleneck
characteristic on processing stimuli which can only operate on one stimulus or
one response at a time [6]. Attention theories propose that the central neural system is limited, so humans are unable to think, remember, perceive or decide more
than one thing at a time. Capacity theory provides a contrary view, assuming
the existence of structural bottlenecks that supposes a limited humans’ capacity
allocable among concurrent activities [12]. The concept of short-memory is introduced, that refers to the capacity of holding a small amount of information in
mind in an active, readily available state for a short period of time. The more one
acquires experience the less cognitive eﬀort he consumes to resolve the same task.
If the amount of cognitive eﬀort that individuals allocate to a task decreases, as
they become more skilled, the rate of change in cognitive eﬀort should depend
on the rate of skill acquisition [13]. Long-term memory is the store of experience
and results of skill acquisition. Arousal is an important factor in regulating attention because it is crucial for motivating certain behaviours [6]. Arousal is a
physiological and psychological concept which refers to the state of being awake.
Motivation, perceived diﬃculty, subjective experience, psychological stress are
all example of factors that play a role in directing attention towards a certain
task. For instance, anxiety or boredom may have impact on performing certain
activities. High ability individuals have larger pool of cognitive resources than
low ability individuals who need to make larger resource adjustments to achieve
the same outcome. Self-regulation theories [14] [15] suggest that individuals with
diﬀerent levels of cognitive ability may react to changes in task diﬃculty in different ways. Low ability people with a high degree of perceived diﬃculty require

Fig. 1. Cognitive Eﬀort inﬂuencing factors

68

L. Longo and S. Barrett

more cognitive eﬀort in performing a task [16]. The conscientiousness may moderate the level of attention on a task: highly conscientious individuals choose
to work harder and persevere longer than individuals with lower level of conscientiousness [17]. We propose a summary of the main inﬂuencing factors in
ﬁgure 1.

3

A Proposal Methodology

One of the main diﬃculties in discussing cognitive eﬀort is that the phenomenon
has a subjective nature. Studies in psychology and neuro-sciences have attempted
to provide a detailed deﬁnition of the concept but they demonstrated restricted
scope over limited aspects of the concept. The present study, on the contrary,
diﬀers from the previous ones because we adopt an approach based on synthesis,
that seeks to develop a more comprehensive basis for computing cognitive eﬀort.
For any deﬁnition of cognitive eﬀort we can formulate a test of the formalism
to understand whether it is suitable to the accepted deﬁnition. This approach
is powerful because it may be seen as a reﬁning stage towards a formalism that
satisﬁes most people’s views of cognitive eﬀort, what it is and how it works. The
formalism is conceived from experience, intuitive expectations about cognitive
eﬀort from a subjective point of view, and conclusions to be found in the psychological, philosophical and sociological literature. The methodology’s goal is to
merge together diﬀerent observations, intuitions and deﬁnitions to build a simple
formalism that is supposed to model the way cognitive eﬀort behaves. We make
no aﬃrmations about the validity of the formalism, even if based on literature’s
studies, but we claim that the results of the application of the formalism to a
consideration of cognitive eﬀort is the same as if we had been considering the
problem using real cognitive eﬀort.
To deal with the formalisation of cognitive eﬀort we propose to adopt the
Popper methodology, presented in The Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery [10] where he
asserted that: a scientiﬁc theory should be based on a “falsiﬁcation” approach in
which no number of experiments can ever prove a theory but a single experiment
can contradict one. He suggested that empirical theories are characterised by
falsiﬁability and must satisfy the following criteria:
– demarcation: the theory must demarcate the area from pseudo-science, it
must be testable, refutable and falsiﬁable [11].
– simplicity: the theory must be simple. Simplicity is better than complexity
because it allows extreme tests and experimentations on the theory, making
it more scientiﬁc than complex theories.
– replication/duplication: the theory must be capable of replication and/or duplication. Obtained results must be able to be repeated and as a consequence
we can convince ourselves that we are not dealing with a mere isolated coincidence but with regular and reproducible events which are inter-subjectively
testable.
Scientiﬁc theories are not static and they change perpetually: the formalism
presented here can be continually reﬁned.
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An Example Heuristic Formalism

Few studies have tried to measure cognitive eﬀort and they can be classiﬁed in
three groups [18]: subjective or self-report measurement, performance and physiological measures. Self-report measures have always attracted researchers: no one
is able to provide a more accurate judgement with respect to experienced mental load than the person concerned. However, self-report measures suﬀer from
diﬀerent rating scales and personal judgements. Performance measures are taskdependent and primary and secondary task approaches have been widely used so
far, producing good results [18]. Unfortunately, these techniques require laboratory tools to measure, for instance, the reaction-time useful to assess the amount
of cognitive eﬀort required for completing a task. Physiological measures represent the most accurate way of assessing mental workload, often unobtrusively,
but they need appropriate equipment to measures physiological behaviours such
as blood temperature, pupils dilation. The formalisation of cognitive eﬀort as a
computational concept needs to rely less on these classical measurements and it
needs to focus on more general concepts easy to model. Indeed, we need a tool to
monitor users’ behaviour while performing a task, and we assume that this tool
can be build up as a piece of software. We have analysed the factors involved
in assessing cognitive eﬀort and we propose a possible formalisation of each of
them towards a general model.
Cognitive Ability: Some people obviously and consistently understand new
concepts more quickly, solve new problem faster, see relationships and are more
knowledgeable about a wider range of topics than others. Modern psychological
theory views cognitive ability as a multidimensional concept and several studies,
today known as IQ tests, tried to measure this trait [19]. Carroll suggested
[20] that there is a tendency for people who perform well in a speciﬁc range
of activities, to perform well in all others as well. Recent work [21] suggests
that some aspects of people’s cognitive ability peak around the age of 22 and
begin a slow decline starting around age 27. However, as it is noted, there is a
great deal of variance among people and most cognitive functions are at a highly
eﬀective level into their ﬁnal years, even when living a long life. Some type of
mental ﬂexibility decreases relatively early in adulthood, but that how much
knowledge one has, and the eﬀectiveness of integrating it with one’s abilities,
may increase throughout all of adulthood if there are no pathological diseases.
These considerations represent pieces of evidence that allow us to model cognitive
ability with a growing function, i.e. a curve that starts at low levels and increases
quickly to a growing rate threshold from which it still increases but moderately.
The ﬂexible sigmoid function proposed by Yin et al. in [22] is suitable for our
purposes.
CA : [1..Gth ]3 ∈ ℵ3 → [0..1] ∈ 


 G Gth
th −Gr
t
Gth − t
CA(Gth , Gr , t) = CAmax 1 +
Gth − Gr
Gth
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where CA is the level of cognitive ability, Gth is the growing threshold, which
we may set to an average of mortality of 85 years. Gr is the growing rate, which
we may set to 22 years, i.e. the point where the curve reaches the maximum
growing weight and from that, increases moderately. t is the age in years of a
person and CAmax is the maximum level of cognitive ability an individual can
reach, in this case equal to 1. The properties Gth and Gr are ﬂexible because
they can be chosen by considering environmental factors such as the degree of
mortality or level of education of a country. For instance, if we consider a person
40 years old, with a growing rate of 22 years and a growing threshold of 85 years,
by applying the formula above, we obtain 0.62 of cognitive ability.
Arousal: The concept of arousal was sometimes treated in literature as a unitary dimension, as if a subject’s arousal state could be completely speciﬁed by a
single measurement such as the size of his pupil [6]. However this is a oversimpliﬁcation and arousal is a multidimensional concept that may vary in diﬀerent
situations and, above all, there are several kinds of individual-subjective factors
to consider. This is a relevant problem in studying subjective cognitive eﬀort,
but the main goal of our contribution is to present the main factors that inﬂuence it. For this reason, we propose a simple subjective arousal taxonomy where
diﬀerent type of arousal, such as curiosity, motivation, anxiety, psychological
stress, are organised in a multi-level tree. In other words this represents a map
of an individual subjective status before performing a certain task. A subjective
arousal taxonomy is a 3-tuple < A, W, R > composed by a set of pieces of arousal
factors A organised in a tree where their unidirectional relationship in the tree
is deﬁned in R by using the weights in W. Each node has at most one parent,
except the root node which has no parent. Each internal node ai has a ﬁxed
inﬂuence strength wi towards his only parent. Just leaf nodes (node without
children), with cardinality Cardln , have a value in [0..1] ∈  which indicates the
degree of arousal (eg. 0 is not motivated at all, 1 is highly motivated) while each
internal node’s and the root node’s values are inferred by the relationship with
their children along with the related strength. The root of the tree is the ﬁnal
level of arousal that inﬂuences the degree of cognitive eﬀort.
A : {a1 , a2 , ....., an | ai : [0..1] ∈ , 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
W : {w1 , w2 , ....., wn | wi : [0..1] ∈ , 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
R : {∀ ai ∃! ri | ri : A × A → W, ri (ai , ap ) = wi }
where ap is ai ’s parent. The degree of each arousal ai for leaf nodes is an explicit
input value while the degree of each arousal ai for internal nodes is the weighted
sum of its c children’s values.
c
= ( z=0 (az · wz )) ≤ 1
aint
i
Finally the root’s weight wroot is 1 and, as it has no parent, its relation rroot = ∅.
The root node inferred by applying the previous steps is:
Aroot : ACardln × W n × Rn → [0..1] ∈ 
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Intentions: Subject’s intentions have an important role in determining the level
of cognitive eﬀort while performing a task. This individual subjective concept may
be splitted into short-term and long-term intentions. We propose to model these
concepts with real values computing their average. We refer to short-term intentions or momentary intentions with Ist and to long-term intentions with Ilt which
are subjective judgements in the range [0..1] (0: no intentions at all, 1: highly intentioned). Intentional shades can be modelled: a person can be highly intentioned
to get a degree (long-term) but in short-time does not like examinations.
I : [0..1]2 ∈ 2 → [0..1] ∈ , IST : [0..1] ∈ , ILT [0..1] ∈ 
IST + ILT
I(IST , ILT ) =
2
Involuntary Context Bias: Several factors can inﬂuence cognitive eﬀort as
pseudo-static and unpredictable biases. The latter refer to biases which are almost static and depend on environmental aspects. For instance, there is a large
diﬀerence across ethnic groups and geographic areas in the available knowledge:
people living in Africa have a reduced access on knowledge compared to people
living in occidental countries so they may ﬁnd a question more or less diﬃcult.
Similarly, another pseudo-static bias is the task diﬃculty. Even though it is hard
to exactly estimate the complexity of diﬀerent tasks, it is not expensive to claim
that reading a newspaper demands less cognitive eﬀort than resolving a math
equation. Cognitive eﬀort may be eventually inﬂuenced by unpredictable context biases. For instance, in a working context, phone ringing, questions from
colleagues, e-mail delivering all represent involuntary context biases. We propose
to use a ranking system to build up a task-diﬃculty dictionary and real values
to model contextual available knowledge and unpredictable bias.
Cknow , Tdif f , Ubias : [0..1] ∈ 
CB : [0..1] ∈ 3 → [0..1] ∈ 3 ,
1
1
1
CB(Cknow , Tdif f , Ubias ) = · Cknow + · Tdif f + · Ubias
3
3
3
where CB is the total context bias, Cknow is the contextual knowledge availability, Tdif f is the task diﬃculty and Ubias is the unpredictable bias. This formula is
ﬂexible because provides a way to model particular situations. We may formalise
a situation where a person in Central Africa can not use the Internet, so low level
of knowledge availability, performing an hard physics task in a noisy library.
Perception: The same task may be perceived diﬀerently by two subjects. Perceived diﬃculty is higher when individuals are presented to new tasks: they may
not know what the optimal amount of eﬀort is, given a particular diﬃculty level.
We propose to model this concept as a value P D : [0..1] ∈  where values near 0
indicate tasks perceived to be very easy and values tending to 1 represent tasks
perceived highly complex.
Time: Time is a crucial factor that must be considered in modelling cognitive
eﬀort. Time-pressure is sometimes imposed by explicit instruction to hurry and
sometimes by demand characteristics of the task. In the former case a real value
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is suﬃcient to model the concept, while in the latter we may easily add a taskrelated time-pressure value to the task-diﬃculty dictionary previously proposed.
Formally: Tpress : [0..1] ∈ . Furthermore, time is essential because performing a
task is not a single-instant action, rather is an action over time. This fact suggests
that the described factors that inﬂuence the level of cognitive eﬀort need to be
considered within an interval of time. Several temporal formal methods and
theories are available in literature and studying the temporal-related aspect of
cognitive eﬀort requires a separate contribution. We remind this investigation
to future work and in this ﬁrst attempt we propose a simple cognitive eﬀort
formalism that propagates all the proposed factors at the same level over time.
We assume the existence of a function Ftime : ℵ → [0..1] ∈  that models the
trajectory of focused attention for each task over time: it returns the level of
attention at a given time. Finally, we propose to model cognitive eﬀort as a
discrete function:
CE : ([0..1]6 ∈ 6 ) × () × (f : ℵ → [0..1] ∈ ) → 






CA = CA(Gth , Gr , t), A = Aroot , I = I(Ist , Ilt ),








CB = CB(Cknow , Tdif f , Ubias ), P D = P D, tp = tpress , t = t














CE(CA , A , I , CB , P D , tp , t ) =


t














[CA + A + I + CB + P D + tp ]
Ftime (i) ·
6
i=0

where CA is cognitive ability, Aroot is arousals, I is intentions, CB is contextual
bias, tpress is time pressure, ftime is the function for attention over time and t is
the eﬀective time spent to complete a task. Therefore, the ﬁnal level of cognitive
eﬀort elicited on a task is a function of time and of the individual subjective
status along with environmental properties.

5

Possible Applications

The formalism proposed in this paper may be applied in several disciplines such
as computer science, psychology, neuro-science, economy. Here we present some
example of its application. We assume all the cognitive eﬀort inﬂuencing factors are available and can be gathered by using unobtrusive appropriate tools,
monitors/loggers or derived from works and studies in literature. In education
contexts, we may use the formalism to monitor the learning rate of students
based on the hypothesis that students should show less cognitive eﬀort in performing similar tasks due to their skill acquisition level. The more they acquire
knowledge, the less cognitive eﬀort they should spend in similar activities. Recommender systems may beneﬁt from using the cognitive eﬀort formalism, such as
the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia, that foresees interactions among users and
web-pages. The more users spend cognitive eﬀort in contributing towards the
improvement of an article, the more their contribution may be considered qualitative. Therefore, we may hypothesise that the trustworthiness of a Wikipedia
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article may depend on the quality of contributions. Similarly, in social search,
assuming the existence of a logger that captures Internet users’ behaviour while
surﬁng web-pages, cognitive eﬀort may be adopted to predict users’ interests on
a particular web document. Here the hypothesis is that the more users show a
positive degree of cognitive eﬀort on a web-page, the more that web-page may
be considered interesting. Yet, if most of the users show similar level of cognitive
eﬀort on a web page, that means similar behaviours, we may infer a level of
trustworthiness to it, which can be either positive or negative. Extending this
concept to the WWW, a social search engine may be conceived. In online communities, such as blogs, forums, social networks, people interact with each other
leaving feedback. Here the amount of cognitive eﬀort may help to classify most
active and trustworthy users: ﬁnance forum may beneﬁt from our formalism.
Measuring cognitive eﬀort may be helpful for clinical purposes as well. If we can
assess a degree of cognitive eﬀort spent on a certain task, and we are able to do
this repeatedly over time, we may predict people’s addiction to that task. This
is based on the hypothesis that addicted people show persistence of cognitive
eﬀort, that means the same behaviour on a task over time. A clinical addiction
predictor may be adopted to have a ﬁrst insight into the degree of addictiveness
of online game player or betters. Similarly, psychologists may use the formalism
as a preliminary tool to study individuals’ addictiveness. In neuro-science, the
application of the formalism may avoid the use of fMRI scanners for patients
who show low addicted behaviour.

6

Open Issues and Future Works

This contribution is an introduction of a formalism for cognitive eﬀort which is
useful in clarifying and motivating discussion of the concept and is extensible
to take into consideration further studies in the area. In addition the formalism is implementable, it oﬀers the basis for the ﬁrst implementation of cognitive
eﬀort in an intelligent artiﬁcial agent. Being based on simple mathematics, it
provides the ideal tool for artiﬁcial agents in making reasoned decisions. The
main aim of this contribution is to increase the understanding of cognitive effort and to provide a tool of great importance as an indicator of work which
could be done. Despite these considerations and the intrinsic complexity of the
phenomenon, cognitive eﬀort is also to a large extent automatic, unconscious so
further studies need to be carried out. Subjective cognitive eﬀort, in our opinion,
is a non-monotonic concept, further inﬂuencing factors may be added to the formalism attacking or supporting previous ones, other may be grouped, other ones
deleted. A defeasible reasoning logic may describe the relations among factors.
The phenomenon may be modelled by a more appropriate algebra or ﬁrst-order
logic. Several decisions contributed in the formalisation of cognitive eﬀort: some
of these imposed a general structure of cognitive eﬀort which may be not always
valid. This contribution is the ﬁrst attempt in formalising cognitive eﬀort as a
computational concept, so it does not aim to be the ﬁnal implementation but,
instead, a ﬁrst basic clariﬁcation tool that need to be faced and reﬁned over
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time. It is beneﬁcial to social science because it allows the precise discussion
of the concept of cognitive eﬀort. In the new Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence
ﬁeld it allows robustness and sensible behaviour in unpredictable and patchy
environments and it allows agents to reason sensibly about other agents, either
human or artiﬁcial.
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